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STRENGTHENING SECTION 14141: USING PATTERN OR
PRACTICE INVESTIGATIONS TO END VIOLENCE
BETWEEN POLICE AND COMMUNITIES
“Why is it that officers are not responsible for their acts
when other citizens are?”1
By: Sigourney Norman
INTRODUCTION
Imagine you are on your way home from work and driving your
usual route. You hear police sirens getting louder and louder. You
realize you are the subject of their chase, but you cannot imagine
why. You slow down and pull over, not wanting to cause
confrontation. The officer beats on your car door. You roll down
your window and ask why you have been pulled over. The officer
informs you that your tail light is broken. Next, the officer orders
you out of the car. Your heart races as the officer pats you
down. You wonder if the officer knows you are in arrears for child
support, a punishable offense in South Carolina.2 You hope for a
chance to explain your situation.
You ask the officer why you needed to leave the vehicle. Rather
than offer a verbal explanation, the officer draws a weapon.
Gripping his weapon, the officer tries to pin you down and
handcuff you. You know you haven’t done anything worth going
to jail over, so you resist! You feel like you have fought him off,
but suddenly you feel a sharp burn of a taser shot. Unsure of what
the officer will do next, you grab the device that injured you and
throw it to the ground. Now is your chance to break away! You
run, unarmed. Dashing for your life, you get about fifteen feet
1 Associated Press, Cincinnati Officer is Acquitted in Killing That Ignited Unrest, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 27, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/27/us/cincinnati-officer-isacquitted-in-killing-that-ignited-unrest.html (quoting the mother of Timothy Thomas, an
unarmed black teenager shot and killed by a Cleveland police officer).
2 See Child Support, S.C. BAR, https://www.scbar.org/public/get-legal-help/commonlegal-topics/child-support/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2019).
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away. Suddenly, you feel indescribably painful blows to your
spine. The officer fires repeated gun shots when you were
seventeen feet ahead, unarmed and back turned away. You swiftly
fall to the ground, only this time never to wake up again. The
officer places the taser near your lifeless body, and walks away.
These are Walter Scott’s last moments on earth. Scott, an
unarmed black man, died by eight consecutive gunshots fired at
his back by a white police officer.3 This violent arrest would not
have receive attention but for a home video taken by a bystander.4
When questioned, the police officer explained that his gunfire was
a reaction of “total fear.”5 Conversely, video footage shows Scott
did not pose a deadly threat.6 The footage also reveals the officer
placing the taser next to Scott’s lifeless body, perhaps attempting
to skew the evidence.7
Scott’s death echoes the loss of Michael Brown, an unarmed
black teenager who died by lethal excessive use of force in 2014, in
Ferguson, Missouri.8 Although some evidence suggests Mr. Brown
put his hands up offering a truce as the officer closed in on him,
the officer proceeded to fire twelve rounds at the teenager.9 That
same year, Mr. Garner, an unarmed black man, was approached
by a group of policemen for the petty violation of selling loose
cigarettes.10 A “swarm” of police officers surrounded him while
one put him in a choke hold. 11 Garner died gasping for air and

3 Michael S. Schmidt & Matt Apuzzo, South Carolina Officer is Charged With Murder
of Walter Scott, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/08/us/southcarolina-officer-is-charged-with-murder-in-black-mans-death.html.
4 See Alan Blinder, Michael Slager, Officer in Walter Scott Shooting, Gets 20-Year
Sentence, N.Y. Times (Dec. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/07/us/michaelslager-sentence-walter-scott.html?_r=0.
5 Id.
6 See id.
7 Id.
8 See Larry Buchanan et al., What Happened in Ferguson?, N.Y. TIMES (last updated
Aug. 10, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/08/13/us/ferguson-missouritown-under-siege-after-police-shooting.html.
9 See id.
10 See Al Baker et al., Beyond the Chokehold: The Path to Eric Garner’s Death, N.Y.
Times (June 13, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/14/nyregion/eric-garner-policechokehold-staten- island.html.
11 See Joseph Goldstein & Nate Schweber, Man’s Death After Chokehold Raises Old
Issue for the Police, N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/19/nyregion/staten-island-man-dies-after-he-is-put-inchokehold-during-arrest.html?smid=pl-share.
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crying, “I can’t breathe.”12 In 2016, Philando Castile, a father and
husband, died by five police gunshots as he peacefully reached for
his license and registration, his girlfriend and daughter in the
vehicle witnessing the violence.13 Then, on March 18, 2018, two
officers who did not identify themselves as law enforcement
approached Stephon Clark in his grandmother’s backyard and
shouted for Clark to come forth.14 Suspecting his involvement in
a recent crime, the officers asked Clark to reveal his hands. 15 The
officers shot Clark repeatedly before he could show himself to be
unarmed.16 When officers approached Clark’s body, they found
that he was in fact unarmed.17 Again, on June 19, 2018,
seventeen-year-old honors student Antwon Rose was shot three
times as he ran away from a traffic stop.18 These accounts capture
a glimpse of the staggering amount of annual police homicides of
civilians.19
Communities of color and their allies are responding to these
incidents of violence through activist organizations including, but
not limited to, the Black Lives Matter (“BLM”) movement.20
Vocalizing citizen support for heightened accountability of
American police forces through groups like BLM is critical because
the movement brings national awareness to persistent, systemic
racialized violence against people of color.21 However, awareness
12 Baker et al., supra note 10.
13 See Matt Furber & Richard Pérez-Peña, After Philando Castile’s Killing, Obama
Calls Police Shootings ‘an American Issue’, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/08/us/philando-castile-falcon-heights- shooting.html.
14 See Jamiles Lartey, Stephon Clark family joins hundreds in Sacramento for fifth
day of protest, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 1, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2018/mar/31/stephon-clark-hundreds-condemn-police-killing-in-fourth-night-ofprotest.
15 See id.
16 See id.
17 See id.
18 Melissa Gomez, Antwon Rose, Killed by a Police Office, Is Remembered at Funeral
as a ‘Bright Light’, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/25/us/antwon-rose-funeral-pittsburgh-police.html.
19 See Jon Swaine & Ciara McCarthy, Killings by US police logged at twice the
previous rate under new federal program, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 15, 2016),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/dec/15/us-police-killings-department-ofjustice-program (explaining that a Guardian study documented 1,146 civilian homicides
perpetrated by police in 2015).
20 See What We Believe, BLACK LiVES MATTER,
https://blacklivesmatter.com/about/what-we-believe/.
21 See id.
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does not change the system without a corresponding change in our
laws.22 Using 42 U.S.C. § 14141, we can ground activism in a
change in our legal structure. Through § 14141’s uniquely legal
response to police brutality, we can enforce peaceable arrest
practices across our Nation’s cities. Section 14141’s power to
create change is grounded in its basis on evidence, strong judicial
processes, and power to enjoin police departments to specific terms
and particularized outcomes designed on a city by city basis.
This note argues that 42 U.S.C. § 14141 is a critical pillar of civil
rights legislation because it creates specific accountability for
police institutions which cannot be provided through advocacy
groups alone. Likewise, § 14141 requires municipal adherence to
reforms, thereby addressing unconstitutional policing at a local
level—a task which is impossible under the framework of other
existing civil rights laws.23
Although § 14141 fills a critical gap in civil rights legislation, it
is not without flaws.24 For example, § 14141 is a strong changemaker when the federal government is actively surveilling local
police departments.25 Cities under active surveillance see policeto-civilian
violence
decrease
and
community-to-police
communication increase.26
However, we find inconsistent
outcomes in reform for the years and decades following § 14141
when, after cities prove their adherence to reform, leading the
federal government to ceases its oversight as the federal
government is convinced of the reform’s soundness. 27 This note
responds to § 14141’s inconsistent long-term effectiveness by first
evaluating causes of discrepancies in enduring reform adherence
between different police departments formerly under federal
review. Second, this note will demonstrate that grounding reform
on specific political leaders undermines long-term reform.
Conversely, grounding reform in local groups representing both
22 See id.
23 See Rachel A. Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights Through Proactive Policing Reform,
62 STAN. L. REV. 1, 3, 4, 7, 20 (2009).
24 See A ‘Pattern or Practice’ of Violence in America, BLOOMBERG (May 27, 2015),
https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2015-doj-and-police-violence/.
25 See id.
26 See id.
27 See Kimbriell Kelly et al., What Happens When Police Are Forced to Reform?,
FRONTLINE (Nov. 13, 2015), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/what-happenswhen-police-are-forced-to-reform/.
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police and city residents strengthens the capacity for enduring
change. Thus, ultimately this note proposes that the most
effective mechanism to ensure long-term reform under 42 U.S.C. §
14141 is amending the statute to legally empower local citizen
groups within the reform process.
Section I explores the history of civil rights actions against police
and police institutions before 42 U.S.C. § 14141 by highlighting
the problematic reliance on Reconstruction Era statutes. It then
explores how the expansion of citizen causes of action allowed for
recovery against individual police officers, but still indemnified
police departments. Section II discusses the impetus behind the
creation of 42 U.S.C. § 14141. It then explains the legal steps
necessary to bring about federal oversight under 42 U.S.C. § 14141
and the practical application of changes proposed by the
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) to departments under federal
review.
Section III evaluates the varying results of § 14141 and studies
in detail the best practices from major cities, such as Pittsburgh,
Los Angeles, and Cincinnati. This note seeks to understand why
these practices created lasting, improved relations between police
and their communities and relies on DOJ filings, regional crime
data, and scholarly case studies.
Section IV proposes amending 42 U.S.C. § 14141, such that its
legal mechanism incorporates the strategies which have had the
most success since the Act’s enactment in 1994. Section IV
proposes Congress create a legal mechanism empowering
community groups to act as oversight bodies during federal
oversight. Building the legal role of these institutions creates a
system of accountability that can outlast the length of a federal
oversight period. Moreover, by involving the community in
designing local reforms, the process will be driven by longstanding groups whose investment in the process will support
change lasting longer than shifts in local political leadership.
Most importantly, legally empowering community groups in
partnership with the DOJ will overcome police department
resistance to changes more effectively than the threat of further
DOJ action alone.
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I. HISTORY OF CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS AGAINST POLICE AND
POLICE INSTITUTIONS
Before 42 U.S.C. § 14141, 42 U.S.C § 1983 and the Fourteenth
Amendment created a civil cause of action for citizens that
providing monetary damages in instances of police brutality.28
This legal framework for protecting citizens against excessive use
of force by police is the same framework enacted one hundred
twenty-three years earlier to protect newly freed slaves from
violent pro-confederate groups.29
During the southern
reconstruction from 1863-1877, the Ku Klux Klan whipped and
murdered blacks who tried to exercise their newly granted right to
vote.30 The Antebellum Republican Congress drafted the Ku Klux
Klan Act to provide immediate relief from the violent,
discriminatory attacks.31 One section of this legislation became
the current text for 42 U.S.C. § 1983,32 which reads:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress . . . .33
Though originally created for the unique setting of the post-Civil
War south, this legislation later provided a civil cause of action for
individual citizens whose constitutional rights were deprived by
police.34

28 See Matthew J. Silveira, An Unexpected Application of 42 U.S.C. § 14141: Using
Investigative Findings for § 1983 Litigation, 52 UCLA L. REV. 601, 606, 608 (2004).
29 See id. at 607, n. 20. “Congress passed § 1983 as part of the Ku Klux Klan Act of
1871 at the tail-end of ‘[a] wave of federal civil rights legislation.’” Id.
30 See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: CIVIL RIGHTS
– PART I 443 (Chelsea House Publishers, 1970).
31 See David Achtenberg, A “Milder Measure of Villainy”: The Unknown History of 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and the Meaning of “Under Color of” Law, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 1, 7 (1999).
32 Id. at 2.
33 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018) (emphasis added).
34 See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171-72 (1961).
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A. Limitations Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
For almost a century, from the Antebellum Era of the late 1860s
to the civil rights movement of the 1960s, a private citizen
succeeding on a § 1983 claim under the Fourteenth Amendment
against police departments proved practically impossible.35
Instead, plaintiffs relied on the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to seek relief for police misconduct, which
proclaims no state shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction
equal protection of the laws.” 36 This language means states must
apply the laws to each of its citizens in the same manner.37 When
bringing a Fourteenth Amendment claim against a state actor,
which includes a police department, victims’ claims are required
to fall under one of two complaints: (1) the department used an
explicit race-based classification policy38; or (2) the department
used a policy that is “impartial in appearance” but applied
discriminatorily against a group.39
Applying the first cause of action to police misconduct was rarely
successful because explicit race-based policies became almost
unheard of in policy-making.40 Likewise, proving that a police
department acted in a consciously discriminatory manner is an
evidentiary barrier for private litigants.41 Thus, the second
approach is only marginally easier to succeed on in court.
Monroe v. Pape changed the landscape for claims against police
departments by changing the interpretation of the phrase “color
35 See Michael S. Vaughn & Lisa F. Coomes, Police Civil Liability Under Section 1983:
When Do Police Officers Act Under Color of Law?, 23 J. CRIM. JUST. 395, 396-97 (1995).
36 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
37 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985).
38 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (explaining that “[t]he central
purpose of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the prevention of
official conduct [which includes police officers] discriminating on the basis of race . . . But
our cases have not embraced the proposition that a law or other official act, without regard
to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional Solely because
it has a racially disproportionate impact.”).
39 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373 (1886) (“Though the law itself be fair on its
face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority
with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal
discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the
denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution.”).
40 See Report to the United Nations on Racial Disparities in the U.S. Criminal Justice
System, SENTENCING PROJECT (Apr. 19, 2018),
https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/un-report-on-racial-disparities/.
41 See Harmon, supra note 23, at 9.
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of” law in the text of 42 U.S. C. § 1983 from being limited to strictly
private actors, such as Ku Klux Klan members, to including
institutional actors such as police officers and their supervising
departments.42 The Supreme Court found that the Antebellum
Congress created the initial Ku Klux Klan Act to properly enforce
the Fourteenth Amendment.43 Thus, this same language in the
descendant statute, namely 42 U.S.C. § 1983, is intended to
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.44 Furthermore, this statute
reaches the conduct of institutional state actors.45 In effect, the
Court held that the statute grants a federal cause of action to
“parties deprived of constitutional rights, privileges and
immunities by an official’s abuse of his position” against state
actors, such as police officers.46 The Court found that Congress
may override state police power, even when “[i]mmunity is given
to crime,” as is the case when a police department shields officers
who engage in misconduct from legal recourse.47 In fact, the Court
highlighted legislative history wherein the Antebellum Congress
sought to remedy violations of civil rights where state officials,
serving as sheriffs, upheld practices denying civil rights to a
certain class of people and remained at their posts with no
reproach from other citizens or the state.48 The Court then
described that present-day police officers and departments who
also functionally deprive citizens of their civil rights will be
federally liable under this statute.49
B. Private Citizens Attempt § 1983 Claims Against Police and
Police Departments
Following Monroe v. Pape, a critical element in a private citizen
§ 1983 claim against a specific police officer is the causation
analysis showing the officer was personally involved in the
42 See Avidan Y. Cover, Reconstructing the Right Against Excessive Force, 68 FLA. L.
REV. 1773, 1778; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2010).
43 See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171 (1961).
44 See id.
45 See id. at 171-72.
46 Id. at 172.
47 See id. at 175.
48 See id. at 177.
49 See id. at 180.
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unconstitutional conduct.50 An officer personally conducting an
arrest almost certainly satisfies this requirement; however,
officers who are on the scene and viewing the arrest process may
or may not be jointly liable.51 Plaintiffs’ arguments against
participating officers hinged on those officers’ awareness of the
wrong committed.52 When an officer was unaware of the civil
rights deprivation, a plaintiff could not recover against the
bystander-officer.53 If, on the other hand, the bystander-officer
was aware of the unconstitutional conduct, and failed to prevent
unlawful behavior, the plaintiff could recover against the
bystander-officer.54 For instance, when two officers guarded a
room while a plaintiff screamed in pain as he was beaten with
nightsticks by a third officer, the court found that the two
guarding officers heard and understood a beating was going on,
and therefore were liable for failing to protect the plaintiff because,
“a police officer may not ignore the duty imposed by his office and
fail to stop other officers who summarily punish a third person in
his presence or otherwise within his knowledge.” 55
Arguably, § 1983 claims against supervisors of delinquent
officers involved in unlawful conduct are more effective than
claims against individual officer because they may incentivize
internal reforms.56 Furthermore, society receives the message
that such conduct is a system-wide issue and not a dismissible,
isolated incident when claims are brought against supervisors. 57
However, supervisor claims are significantly more nuanced than
claims against individual officers and are thus harder to prove
under § 1983.58 In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the plaintiffs allegedly
experienced unlawful force while detained because of
discrimination on the basis of national origin, Muslim religion and

50 See MICHAEL AVERY ET AL., POLICE MISCONDUCT: LAW AND LITIGATION 340 (3d ed.
2017).
51 See id.
52 See Byrd v. Brishke, 466 F.2d 6, 10-11 (7th Cir. 1972).
53 See Michael Avery et al., Police Misconduct: Law and Litigation Highlights § 4:2
(2018).
54 See Byrd, 466 F.2d at 10-11.
55 See id. at 9-11.
56 See AVERY ET AL., supra note 53, at 346.
57 See id. at 346–47.
58 See id. at 347-48.
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race.59 In this case, the Supreme Court effectively indemnified
high level supervisors from personal liability because “mere
knowledge of [a] subordinate’s discriminatory purpose” does not
meet the burden of proof. 60 The supervisors’ mental state of
“knowledge” or “acquiescence” to discrimination carried out by
subordinates was not enough to be the discriminatory purpose
element necessary to succeed on a claim.61
Moreover, in Wellington v. Daniels, a witness testified that the
plaintiff ran away from an officer, posing no threat to the officer’s
life; but, in order to apprehend and arrest him, the officer battered
the plaintiff with a flashlight, causing permanent physical
paralysis.62 The offending officer’s supervisor knew that the use
of flashlights as a weapon causing serious injury or death was a
national policing issue, but did not ban these flashlights or retrain
his police to refrain from using them as a weapon, as other police
forces around the nation had done.63 Still, the court found for the
supervisor, indemnifying him of any liability for the subordinate’s
overuse of force because the plaintiff “failed to establish a pattern
of excessive use of force” necessary to support his claim.64
Private plaintiffs sometimes bolstered their claims of supervisor
liability using expert testimony.65 While this tactic assisted
plaintiffs seeking recovery from an isolated incident, a private
plaintiff who seeks accountability from a supervisor for patterns
of discrimination may face procedural barriers that undermine the
claim.66 For example, if a plaintiff seeks a remedy for patterns of
discrimination under § 1983 using the injuries of other arrestees
59 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 666 (2009).
60 Id. at 677.
61 See id.
62 See Wellington v. Daniels, 717 F.2d 932, 934 (4th Cir. 1983).
63 See id. at 936-37.
64 See id. at 937-38.
65 See AVERY ET AL., supra note 53, at 366. For example, in Gutierrez-Rodriguez v.
Cartagena, officers approached a private citizen in an unmarked car with plain clothes and
guns drawn and fired at the car when the citizen attempted to drive away, thereby injuring
the plaintiff. See Gutierrez-Rodriguez v. Cartagena, 882 F.2d 553, 557 (1st Cir. 1989). The
officer perpetrating misconduct had forty complaints against him for overuse of force and
department records revealed no disciplinary action had been taken to investigate the
officer. See id. at 565-66. Expert testimony established that this number of complaints going
without investigation deviated from the acceptable norm in police departments. Id. Due to
this deviation from standard practice, the court found the supervisor’s gross negligence akin
to discriminatory intent. Id.
66 See AVERY ET AL., supra note 53, at 366.
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to corroborate the plaintiff’s argument, the overall effect may be to
lessen the effectiveness of the claim.67 Each witness called to
testify on a similar deprivation of rights creates small trials within
the larger trial.68 Judges and juries often find this process
confusing and unnecessary.69 Moreover, the plaintiff may have
difficulty finding numerous credible and cooperative witnesses to
assist in the case.70 Thus, even after Monroe v. Pape, § 1983 claims
against individual police officers and their supervisors often failed
or were inadequate.71
C. Limits on Police Department Liability Under § 1983
Plaintiffs rarely succeed on claims against a municipality as an
alternative remedy under § 1983 when their claims against
individual officers failed.72 As with claims against an individual
police officer, plaintiffs bringing claims against a municipality are
required to satisfy Fourteenth Amendment requirements for
discriminatory intent in addition to proving causation and
culpability on the part of the municipality.73 Consequently, a
plaintiff has to prove a local government should have known or
knew about a discriminatory act and that the local government
failed to rectify it.74 This cause of action requires evidence a
plaintiff rarely can assemble because it requires time and
resources to investigate thousands of police records. 75 Moreover,
a plaintiff may struggle to meet the evidentiary standard of
“widespread practice” resulting in “constitutional violations” that
are part of “policies or customs” held by the municipality.76
For example, in Hicks-Field v. Harris County, a correctional
officer responded to an inmate suffering from a schizophrenic
67 See id.
68 Id.
69 See id.
70 Id.
71 See Harmon, supra note 23, at 11-12.
72 See AVERY ET AL., supra note 53, at 368.
73 See id. at 372.
74 See id. n 2, at 389
75 See id. at 365, 367.
76 See id. at 379 (explaining that a plaintiff alleging a constitutional violation by a
police department must show that those unconstitutional policies and procedures were in
widespread use throughout the department).
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attack by fatally punching him in the face and leaving the inmate
unconscious.77 The officer violated protocol by leaving the inmate
unattended rather than seeking medical attention for the inmate
following the use of force.78 Another officer found the inmate, and
took him to the hospital, where the inmate died.79 An autopsy
confirmed homicide as the cause of death.80 Although the
correctional officer directly inflicted violence on the inmate and
personally avoided calling for medical help, under the applicable
evidentiary standards, the municipality could not be held liable for
this unconstitutional behavior.81 Here, the facts of this incident,
the officer’s record, and a DOJ report on the conditions of the jail—
which was excluded from evidence—cumulatively failed to prove
liability.82 Due to the report being excluded from trial, the plaintiff
lost its strongest means of proving a pervasive occurrence of
constitutional violations by the municipality, thus losing its § 1983
claim against the city.83
When private citizens attempted to use § 1983 claims to remedy
patterns of police misconduct, the Supreme Court has resisted
federal discipline of state police. For example, in 1976, plaintiffs
in Rizzo v. Goode demanded federal oversight of the Philadelphia
Police Department, alleging a pervasive pattern of depriving
constitutional rights of African Americans and city residents at
large.84 Though this request would become the purpose and power
of 42 U.S.C. § 14141, here, the Supreme Court struck down
plaintiffs’ request because principles of federalism required that
any discipline of police remain in the hands of the state.85 Indeed,
77 See Hicks-Fields v. Harris Cty., 860 F.3d 803, 806-07 (5th Cir. 2017), aff’g HicksFields v. Harris Cty., No. H-12-3650, 2015 WL 9581844 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 30, 2015).
78 Id. at 807.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 See id. at 808.
82 See id. at 809-10.
83 Id. at 811 (holding that plaintiff’s evidence was not “sufficient to establish an official
policy of Harris County” because there was no proof of persistent, widespread practices
within Harris County). But see Grandstaff v. City of Borger, 767 F.2d 161, 171 (5th Cir.
1985) (holding that courts may however infer “policy or custom” when a city neglects
extremely inappropriate officer conduct; for example, when the city of Borger, Texas did not
investigate the officers who recklessly shot an innocent man in the back, fatally wounding
and killing him, the court reasoned the police department sanctioned reckless use of force
as a general policy).
84 See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 362 (1976).
85 See id. at 366.
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the Court found the plaintiffs’ goal of preventing future abuses by
the department at large irrational because the abuses were only
committed by a small, unnamed minority of the force.86
Furthermore, the Supreme Court reasoned an entire department
may not be held lable for the actions of theres engaging in unlawful
police procedures where a small level of police misconduct inheres
in urban environments.87 Thus, the plaintiffs could not build a
case for systemic police reform.88
In 1980, the U.S. government sued the City of Philadelphia,
alleging systemic police misconduct.89 The DOJ pleaded the city’s
the civil rights abuses included, but were not limited to,
unwarranted searches and seizures, excessive force, denial of legal
counsel and racial slurs committed by a large number of the
force.90 The DOJ argued the department had a system to suppress
public reporting of these abuses and to extricate officers from
liability.91 Nevertheless, the court held the even these specific
allegations did not satisfy a case holding the City of Philadelphia
accountable.92 Furthermore, the court adamantly found the DOJ’s
case dangerous to federalism because police power is specifically
delegated to the states.93 In effect, the court indemnified police
departments from federal redress.
In U.S. v. City of Philadelphia, the dissent argued that federal
intrusion upon state governments is the exact purpose of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. §
1983).94 Dismissing the majority’s federalism argument that
estopped the United States from holding the Philadelphia Police
Department accountable, Circuit Judge Gibbons explained that:
“[T]he [F]ourteenth [A]mendment and the Civil Rights Acts are
what intervene in the workings of local government. They were
intended to intervene. The relief which the federal Executive
86 See id. at 372.
87 See id. at 375.
88 See id. at 366.
89 See United States v. City of Phila., 644 F.2d 187, 189-90 (3d Cir. 1980).
90 Id. at 190; cf Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 372-73 (noting fear of a “small, unnamed minority“
of police officers’ future conduct was insufficient to give plaintiffs a personal stake in the
outcome).
91 City of Phila., 644 F.2d at 190.
92 See id. at 205-06.
93 See id. at 206.
94 Id. at 227 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
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seeks is nothing more than [what] the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment
and the Civil Rights Acts require . . . .”95 Nearly a decade and a
half later, this argument would be embodied in the enactment of
42 U.S.C. § 14141.
II. IMPETUS FOR 42 U.S.C. § 14141
Unrelenting racial tension in the 1990s called congressional
attention to the lack of legal framework to hold police institutions
accountable.96 In particular, the public documentation of the
Rodney King beating in 1991 in Los Angeles brought the
inadequacy of legal remedies for police brutality to the American
consciousness.97 The at-home videotape recorded by a neighbor
captured shocking images of excessive use of violence by police,
thereby bringing the systemic abuse experienced by inner-city
communities to the national stage.98 Local judicial action was
insufficient to address the wrongs against the community because,
even after the clear record of violence, the police personnel
involved were acquitted.99 Public outcry ensued.100 Already tense
relations between the community and police deteriorated
completely as residents of King’s neighborhood expressed their
frustration through historic riots, costing the city of South Los
Angeles one billion dollars in damage.101 Congress responded to
the crisis with the passage of 42 U.S.C. §14141.102
95 Id. at 228.
96 See Brandon E. Patterson, Rodney King and the LA Riots Changed Policing. Now
Jeff Sessions Wants to Turn Back the Clock., MOTHER JONES (Apr. 27, 2017),
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2017/04/rodney-king-jeff-sessions-consent-decreespolicing/.
97 See Fighting Police Abuse: A Community Action Manual, ACLU,
https://www.aclu.org/other/fighting-police-abuse-community-action-manual (last visited
Sept. 23, 2019).
98 See id.
99 Rodney King beating reverberated for years, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2016, 3:15 PM),
http://timelines.latimes.com/rodney-king/.
100 Id.
101 Jennifer Medina, The L.A. Riots 25 Years Later: A Return to the Epicenter, N.Y.
TIMES (April 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/28/us/la-riots-rodney-kingsouth-central%201992.html?rref=collection%2Ftimestopic%2FKing%2C%20Rodney%20Glen&action=cl
ick&contentCollection=tim%20estopics&region=stream&module=stream_unit&version=la
test&contentPlacement=2&pgtype=collection.
102 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION’S PATTERN AND PRACTICE
POLICE REFORM WORK: 1994-PRESENT 3 (2017),
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A. Legal Framework for 42 U.S.C. § 14141
Under 42 U.S.C. § 14141, the federal government may sue a
municipality when the U.S. Attorney General has reasonable
cause to believe that:
[A] governmental authority, or any agent thereof, or any person
acting on behalf of a governmental authority, [has] engage[d] in a
pattern or practice of conduct by law enforcement officers or by
officials or employees of any governmental agency with
responsibility for the administration of juvenile justice or the
incarceration of juveniles that deprives persons of rights,
privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution
or laws of the United States.103
Suits brought under this statute are meant to eliminate
“patterns or practices” and provide equitable relief.104 First, the
DOJ conducts a preliminary investigation.105 The DOJ may call
for an investigation on its own accord,106 or at the demand of city
residents.107 There are even instances of state governments
asking for a federal investigation to help them properly address
civil rights violations in certain police departments. 108 Thus, the
punitive association with federal investigations is misconstrued.
Rather, federal investigations seek to help local departments meet
their policing goals by eliminating systemic misconduct.
If the initial review suggests systemic issues within a police
department, the DOJ proceeds to the second step of conducting a
formal investigation to determine whether legal action against a

https://www.justice.gov/crt/file/922421/download [hereinafter PATTERN AND PRACTICE
POLICE REFORM WORK].
103 See 34 U.S.C. § 12601 (2018) (formerly cited as 42 U.S.C. § 14141).
104 See id.
105 See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, How Department of Justice Civil Rights Division
Conducts Pattern-or-Practice Investigations,
https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/797676/download [hereinafter DOJ Investigations Paper]
(last visited Sept. 15, 2019).
106 See id.
107 See Sari Horwitz et al., Justice Department will investigate practices of Chicago
police, WASH. POST (Dec. 6, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/postnation/wp/2015/12/06/justice-department-will-launch-investigation-into-practices-ofchicago-police/.
108 See Debo P. Adegbile, Policing Through an American Prism, 126 YALE L. J. 2222,
2256 (2017).
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municipality is appropriate.109 Although formal cases against
police departments followed high profile incidents like the 2001
shooting of Timothy Thomas in Cleveland, Ohio110 and the 2014
shooting of Mike Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, 111 one incident is
not enough to bring about a case.112 Instead, a cause of action is
only substantiated when investigations reveal repeated,
systematic unlawful behavior including, but not limited to,
patterns of excessive use of force, promotion systems rewarding
those who engage in excessive force, and systems suppressing
citizen complaints against officers.113
Third, the DOJ initiates litigation against a police
department.114 Not all matters end up in trial. Some departments
agree to pre-trial settlements called “memorandums of
agreement,” whereas departments who take cases to trial are
bound by court ordered agreements called “consent decrees.”115
Both memorandums of agreement and consent decrees are
enforceable in court.116 Finally, the fourth step is implementation
of the memorandum of agreement or the consent decree.117
There have been sixty-nine pattern or practice investigations
since 1994.118 These actions include one-hundred thirty-two
different allegations, forty-eight attributable to excessive use of
force, thirty-eight for discriminatory policing, twenty-nine for
unlawful stops, searches and/or seizures, five for unlawful arrests,
four for poor jail conditions, and the remainder for gender bias in
handling sexual assault reports, improper detentions, sexual
misconduct, retaliation, improper treatment of the mentally ill

109 See DOJ Investigations Paper, supra note 109.
110 See The Associated Press, Cincinnati Officer Is Acquitted in Killing That Ignited
Unrest, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/27/us/cincinnatiofficer-is-acquitted-in-killing-that-ignited-unrest.html.
111 See Larry Buchanan et al., What Happened in Ferguson?, N.Y. TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/08/13/us/ferguson-missouri-town-under-siegeafter-police-shooting.html (last updated Aug. 10, 2015).
112 See DOJ Investigations Paper, supra note 109.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 See PATTERN AND PRACTICE POLICE REFORM WORK, supra note 106, at 20.
116 Id. at 20-21.
117 See id. at 21.
118 Fixing the Force, Allegations, FRONTLINE,
http://apps.frontline.org/fixingtheforce/#allegations (last visited Aug. 31, 2019).
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and violation of due process.119 Eighteen of these actions reached
a so-called “closed” agreement because the police department met
DOJ standards and maintained those standards for two
consecutive years.120 A third of the departments reforming
excessive use of force took nine years or more to eliminate
unlawful policing practices.121 Twenty-one actions are ongoing.122
Though some ongoing agreements are recent and fall within a
five to seven year time frame to make reforms, other cities where
there are layered charges of unconstitutional policing—such as
excessive force paired with unlawful searches and seizures—have
been under federal review for over a decade.123 These extreme
examples include the Detroit, Michigan Police Department, which
was under a consent decree for eleven years to reform excessive
force, unlawful searches, and seizures, as well as poor jail
conditions.124 At present, Detroit is no longer under a formal
decree but must still adhere to a “transitional agreement”
permitting continued federal surveillance.125 Likewise, the
Warren, Ohio Police Department has been in and out of federal
surveillance under short-term agreements since 2004 and has
been under a consent decree since 2012.126 Presently, officials
report that the Warren Police Department still has significant
changes to make regarding excessive use of force.127
B. Common Changes Proposed by the Department of Justice
The implementation of a settlement agreement involves police
departments fulfilling recommendations from the DOJ.128 These
standards often involve changing the mode of policing from that
which emphasizes use of racial profiling and violence to that which
involves the community as a partner, most commonly called
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 See id.
124 Fixing the Force, Allegations, supra note 121.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 See id.
128 See United States v. East Haven, No. 3:12-CV-1652(AWT), 2012 WL 5860787 (D.
Conn. Nov. 20, 2012) (Settlement Agreement and Order).
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“community policing.”129 Tactics in policing vary widely across the
country because every police department varies in size, funding,
and socio-economic community.130 Nevertheless, there are certain
practices which epitomize the mission of community policing.131
For example, the New Orleans Police Department executed the
tenets of community partnership and problem-solving by
innovating a Community-Police Mediation Program to address
police misconduct complaints.132 In New Orleans, a city resident
alleging excessive force, excessive violence, or deprivation of due
process rights will meet with the officer and two specially trained
community-police mediators.133 One mediator is of the same socioeconomic and racial background as the officer and one is of the
same background as the civilian.134 The mediation location
communicates partnership rather than punitive action because it
is held in community-valued spaces like libraries, recreation
centers, and public schools.135 Thus, the mediation process is
structured to rectify any violations of law by police and create a
collaborative relationship between civilians and police. This
reparative function further supports the community policing goal
of crime prevention by increasing the likelihood civilians will feel
safe reporting crime and tipping police off to persons driving crime.
Another popular community policing policy is de-escalation
training.136 Those police departments with reported excessive use
of force reframe their problem-solving methods from those which
rely on deadly force to secure a suspect to those which slow the
arrest process down to reduce tension between the civilian and the
129 See U.S. Dep’t of Just., Community Policing Defined, 1, 3,
https://cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/vets-to-cops/e030917193-CP-Defined.pdf [hereinafter
Community Policing Defined] (last visited Aug. 31, 2019).
130 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Principles for Promoting Police Integrity: Examples of
Promising Police Practices and Policies, 1, 1, https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojp/186189.pdf
(2001).
131 Community Policing Defined, supra note 134, at 3-4.
132 See Lou Furman & Alison R. McCrary, Feature: Building Trust in Law
Enforcement: Community-Police Mediation in New Orleans, 63 L.A. B. J. 192, 192 (2015).
133 See id.
134 See id.
135 Id.
136 See Tom Jackman, De-esclation training to reduce police shootings facing mixed
reviews at launch, WASH. POST (Oct. 15, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/de-escalation-training-to-reducepolice-shootings-facing-mixed-reviews-at-launch/2016/10/14/d6d96c74-9159-11e6-9c85ac42097b8cc0_story.html.
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officer.137 For example, when Camden, New Jersey officers
encountered a potentially mentally ill civilian brandishing a knife
in the street, the officers followed the civilian on foot until the
optimal moment to disarm him.138 The officers achieved a
community policing goal by resisting the traditional “shoot first”
training and instead finding a way to complete the arrest without
deadly force.139
The police commissioner in Cambridge,
Massachusetts, Robert Haas, expressed the importance of deescalation by saying, “If I back away and the person calms down
and the situation resolves itself, then I’ve done what I came to
do.”140
However, a proper community policing program is comprised of
four more components.141 First, police departments should
institutionalize frequent, positive officer and community member
communications outside of the arrest context.142 The DOJ
recommends departments create police athletic leagues that
engage local families to participate as well.143 This tactic is
particularly useful when it engages disconnected residents in
large housing projects because it creates a sense of trust residents
are willing to rely on when crimes do occur.144 Thus, project
residents are more likely to provide police information needed to
solve crimes than without a previously established relationship.145
Second, the DOJ asks departments to move from twelve-hour
rotating shifts to keeping the same officers consistently patrolling
the same sections of their precinct.146 This seemingly particular
recommendation serves the broader purpose of personalizing the
137 See Matt Apuzzo, Police Rethink Long Tradition on Using Force, N.Y. TIMES (May
4, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/05/us/police-start-to-reconsider-longstandingrules-on-using-force.html.
138 See Jackman, supra note 140.
139 See id.
140 Timothy Williams, Long Taught to Use Force, Police Warily Learn to De-escalate,
N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/28/us/long-taught-to-useforce-police-warily-learn-to-de-escalate.html.
141 See U.S. Dep’t Just. Civ. Rts. Div., Investigation of the Ferguson Police
Department 1, 90 (Mar. 4, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/pressreleases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf [hereinafter
Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department].
142 See id.
143 See id.
144 See id.
145 Id. at 80.
146 Id. at 90.
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civilians being policed so they are less likely to be seen as the
stereotype of a criminal.147 This reassignment of police is paired
with anti-discrimination and anti-bias training to re-train police
away from basing investigative work on racial profiling.148
Furthermore, where racial tensions are particularly high, the DOJ
recommends police construct cultural awareness programs with
community leaders, wherein the leaders create programs needed
to reduce bias against their ethnic group.149
The next critical component is organizational transformation.
The Office of Community Oriented Policing (COPS) describes
organizational
transformation as “[t]he
alignment of
organizational
management,
structure,
personnel,
and
information systems to support community partnerships and
proactive problem-solving.”150 This broad definition provides little
guidance. More telling are specific DOJ recommendations for
transforming police departments who repeatedly deprive citizens’
constitutional rights.
For instance, in New Orleans, the
organizational transformation was geared toward creating a
process to identify excessive use of force, investigate
unconstitutional conduct and properly reprimand officers
violating civilians’ civil rights.151 Particularly, the DOJ sought
changes in promotion systems because the conduct of officers who
receive leadership positions dictates the policing culture.152
Promotion systems that elevate officers who repeatedly use
excessive force incentivize civil rights violations. 153 Conversely,
promotion systems that reward officers who achieve arrests and
investigations without repeated complaints of violence and racial
147 See U.S. Dep’t Just. Civ. Rts. Div., supra note 145 at 87.
148 Id. at 94.
149 See U.S. Dep’t Just. Civ. Rts. Div. & U.S. Atty’s Off. N. Dist. Ill., Investigation of
the Chicago Police Dep’t 1, 161 (2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/925846/download
[hereinafter Investigation of the Chicago Police Dep’t].
150 Community Oriented Policing Services, Measure Community Policing for Free,
U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Apr. 2015), http://cops.usdoj.gov/html/dispatch/042015/measure_cp_for_free.asp.
151 See U.S. Dep’t Just. Civ. Rts. Div., Investigation of the New Orleans Police Dep’t 2,
75-76 (2011),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2011/03/17/nopd_report.pdf.
152 See id. at xvi-xvii.
153 See id. at 66 (explaining that “problematic performance evaluations” lead to officers
being “promoted to supervisory positions when they are not ready or are unqualified to
supervise”).
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profiling incentivize ethical policing.154 Changing criteria, such as
changing point allocations on promotion evaluations, is a practical
application of organizational change.155
Notably, organizational change can also mean changing the
allocation or police resources.156 For example, Baltimore is known
for having “two cities:” a white Baltimore and a black Baltimore.157
In white neighborhoods, the Baltimore Police Department (BPD)
were more responsive to complaints.158 The BPD even conducted
a number of community policing style programs like meetings with
community leaders and the like in white neighborhoods.159
Conversely, the BPD repeatedly neglected resident calls from
minority neighborhoods for police assistance.160 When the BPD
did work in black precincts the response consistently included
physical force or verbal threats.161 In fact, when a female
resident’s home was being searched and she asked for the reason
for the search, BPD officers replied, “shut the fuck up bitch and sit
the fuck down because [we are] the fucking law.”162 The DOJ
decided the diametrically different treatment of the white and
black communities can only be changed with organizational
change through equitable allocation of police officers and requiring
that department leaders engage in the community engagement
programs used in white neighborhoods in black precincts as
well.163 Thus, departments may use certain aspects of community

154 See id. at 11.
155 See id. at 78.
156 See U.S. Dep’t Just. Civ. Rts. Div., Investigation of the Baltimore City Police Dep’t
1, 5 (2016), https://www.justice.gov/crt/file/883296/download [hereinafter Investigation of
the Baltimore City Police Dep’t].
157 Id. at 4-5.
158 See id. at 5.
159 See id. at 156, 160 (explaining, separately, that police are perceived as more
attentive in white neighborhoods, and have only focused community policing efforts on a
select few neighborhoods; it follows that the white neighborhoods have received better
community policing efforts).
160 See id. at 156.
161 See id. at 157.
162 Investigation of the Baltimore City Police Dep’t, supra 160, at 157.
163 See id. at 160 (explaining that community policing must be more widespread and
fully integrated equally into all communities regardless of demographic).
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policing and still need organizational change through equitable
allocation of police resources.164
Organizational change is not only important for implementing
positive changes; it is also integral to ending unconstitutional
police conduct. For example, in Ferguson, Missouri, the DOJ pinpointed processes that curtail excessive use of force.165 First, the
DOJ recommended eliminating informal and formal arrest quotas
to eliminate perceptions that those who make the most arrests are
the best officers.166 Second, all stops, searches, and arrests must
include reports of the facts giving rise to legal authority for that
arrest.167 Third, supervisors must review officer reports for
adequate reasoning for the arrest.168 Notably, these reports are
analyzed for racial trends to identify any disparate treatment in
arrests.169 These procedural checkpoints self-monitor internal
department culture around the use of force, thereby positioning
police and civilian interactions in-line with community policing
values.
Lastly, a final prong common under the organizational change
objective of community policing is aligning police training to
support the partnership goals with which they are tasked. 170 For
example, many community policing reports emphasize working
with “diverse” community leaders.171 In practice, this means
working with leaders of not only racial minority groups, but
religious minorities like Muslims, communities for whom English
is a second language, and the LGBTQ community. 172 Accordingly,
departments must provide anti-bias training that prepares officers
to communicate with the particular set of socio-economic groups
their precincts protect.173 Yet, as the DOJ notes, departments
cannot satisfy training objectives by “sitting in a classroom” for
164 See id. at 156 (stressing that community policing applied only in wealthier white
neighborhoods is inadequate; instead, more community policing needs to occur in minority
neighborhoods).
165 See Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department, supra note 145, at 92.
166 See id. at 91.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 92.
169 See id. at 91–92.
170 See Investigation of the Chicago Police Dep’t, supra note 153, at 160.
171 See id.
172 See id.
173 See id. at 160–61.
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hours but, rather, must satisfy such objectives with “meaningful
content.”174 Thus, training on the constitutional procedure of
arrests should not simply be a thirty-five-year-old video that is
inaccurate to current constitutional standards for police,
accompanied by a check-the-box worksheet quiz.175 Instead,
training must teach police the lawful boundaries for use of force
and incorporate simulation training so that de-escalation tactics
are more likely to be used in the fast-paced arrest setting.176
Through proper training, police are not simply confident to patrol
streets, but competent to fulfill their duties in a lawful manner.
C. Best Practices Under § 14141 for Lasting Reform
Some advocates, including Former Attorney General Jeff
Sessions, argue against the relative value of consent decrees,
questioning the long-term value of federal oversight.177 First, this
section responds to skepticism of § 14141 federal oversight by
identifying how the consent decrees in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania;
Cincinnati, Ohio; and Los Angeles, California created institutional
reform. Moreover, this section differentiates the tactics used in
these case study cities that undermined long-term reform, from
those that supported long-term reform. Finally, this section
identifies local leadership, community-driven reform objectives
and community oversight of police departments as keystones to
lasting reform under § 14141.
In Pittsburg, which was the first city bound to federal oversight
under § 14141 legislation, the short-term results markedly shifted
police culture.178 However political shifts in leadership resulted

174 Id. at 94.
175 Id. at. 95. Investigation of Chicago Police Academy training revealed a course on
the use of deadly force based on a video series created thirty-five years ago. Id. Since this
video had been produced, the Supreme Court has heightened the standards for the
reasonable use of force. Id.
176 Id. at 151.
177 See Eric Lichtblau, Sessions Indicates Justice Department Will Stop Monitoring
Troubled Police Agencies, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/28/us/politics/jeff-sessions-crime.html.
178 See Robert C. Davis, Nicole J. Henderson, & Christopher W. Ortiz, Can Federal
Intervention Bring Lasting Improvement in Local Policing: The Pittsburgh Consent Decree,
VERA INST. JUST. ii, 40 (2005).
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in severe backsliding.179 For instance, in the first year following
the end of federal oversight in Pittsburgh, the community viewed
police as “helpers of victims of crime” because the police
department maintained reform initiatives such as officer training
and use of force oversight.180 These changes continued for a
decade under the former Police Chief Robert McNeilly Jr., who felt
an obligation to his city to maintain terms of the consent decree.181
McNeilly created cutting-edge systems including a modern use-offorce policy and a computerized early warning system to identify
officer misconduct.182 These innovations were so effective, police
departments around the country studied the Pittsburg model and
implemented similar systems.183
However, when the mayor fired McNeilly in 2006 and replaced
him with Nathan Harper in the hopes of moving the police
department in a different direction, the commitment to the
systems setup by McNeilly eroded.184 First, empirically, the
yearly number of use-of-force incidents rose by 38% and the
number of assaults committed against officers rose by 49% under
Harper, all while both property and violent crime trended down,
indicating a breakdown in the policing system. 185 Second, former
Police Chief Harper was indicted in 2013 on conspiracy charges
because he used state funds for personal use. 186 Then, in 2014,
three undercover police officers brutally beat Jordan Miles, a
young African-American high school student who was initially
running from the officers because he thought the plain-clothes

179 See Joshua Chanin, Evaluating Section 14141: An Empirical Review of Pattern or
Practice Police Misconduct Reform, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 67, 78 (2016) (implying that
mayoral changes has negatively impacted police accountability and the relationship
between police and the communities they serve).
180 Id. at 77–78.
181 See Michael A. Fuoco, Police chief McNeilly’s tenure saw wrenching changes, PITT.
POST-GAZETTE (Jan. 9. 2006), https://www.post-gazette.com/local/city/2006/01/09/Policechief-McNeilly-s-tenure-saw-wrenching-changes/stories/200601090107.
182 See id.
183 See id.
184 See Chanin, supra note 183, at 81–83.
185 Id. at 82.
186 See Press Release, W. Dist. Pa. U.S. Atty’s Off., Former Pittsburgh Police Chief
Charged with Conspiracy, Failure To File Federal Tax Returns (Mar. 22, 2013),
https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdpa/pr/former-pittsburgh-police-chief-charged-conspiracyfailure-file-federal-tax-returns.
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men were following him to rob him. 187 Thus, under new
leadership, the reform in Pittsburg regressed to the same violent
arrest procedure which sparked the initial call for reform.
Pittsburg’s reliance on the leadership of the former mayor and
former Police Chief McNeilly illustrates the danger resting an
entire movement of change in one administration. Indeed,
departments who follow this path will lack the institutional
strength to withstand changes in leadership. Instead, reform
efforts must remain vigilant against depending predominantly on
leaders and political timing to enact change. It follows that if, on
the contrary, the § 14141 reform process includes interest groups
outside of city leadership, then reform can withstand fluctuating
political priorities.
For example, in Cincinnati, the city fell under federal oversight
for five years following the unarmed shooting of a black teenager,
Timothy Thomas, in 2001.188 The Cincinnati Police Department
(“CPD”) achieved full reforms of their consent agreement within
five years.189 Moreover, six years following federal oversight,
researchers found no reform erosion.190 Relationships between
the community and police remained strong even following a 2014
incident of the police shooting of Donyale Rowe because the CPD
immediately published the video footage of the incident to the
public and disciplined the officer involved.191 Scholars attribute
Cincinnati’s lasting commitment to transparency and lawful
policing to the two-pronged legal mechanism binding the city to
reform.192 The CPD signed a memorandum of agreement with the
DOJ and signed a concurrent collaborative agreement with both
the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) and the Fraternal

187 See Rich Lord & Liz Navratil, Jordan Miles jury reaches split verdict, PITT. POSTGAZETTE (Mar. 31, 2014), https://www.post-gazette.com/local/city/2014/03/31/Jury-reachesverdict-in-Jordan-Miles-civil-trial/stories/201403310142.
188 See Chanin, supra note 183 at 91; see also The Associated Press, Cincinnati Officer
Is Acquitted in Killing That Ignited Unrest, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2001),
https://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/27/us/cincinnati-officer-is-acquitted-in-killing-thatignited-unrest.html.
189 See Chanin, supra note 183 at 91, 94.
190 Id. at 91.
191 See id. at 94.
192 See id. at 91; Elliot H. Schatmeier, Reforming Police Use-of-Force Practices: A Case
Study of The Cincinnati Police Department, 46 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 540, 557, 562
(2013).
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Order of Police (“FOP”). 193 Each stage of the reform process
involved feedback from the community in which people’s rights
were deprived under previous policies and the police who would be
carrying out new policies.194 More to the point, by incorporating
stakeholder interests in policy creation the city made a durable
agreement between the community and police.
Cincinnati’s second feature enabling long-term reform is the
legal enforceability of the collaborative agreement which
empowered the ACLU and FOP to seek judicial remedies against
the Cincinnati Police Department when met with resistance
against their requested reforms.195 Specifically, the collaborative
agreement permitted court sanctions against the CPD for noncompliance and court-ordered mediation to prevent further
breaches of the agreement.196 In fact, the ACLU and FOP sought
court remedies against the CPD in 2004 because the police
department refused to meet policing standards under § 14141
reform.197 The court responded by placing the parties in courtordered mediation where the ACLU, FOP, and CPD came to an
agreement on local solutions for meeting the federal standards.198
Strikingly, the CPD began substantive reforms following the
court-ordered mediation that continued through the term of
federal supervision and beyond.199
In Los Angeles, the DOJ placed the police department under
federal oversight through a consent decree for twelve years, from
2001 to 2013.200 The decree focused reforms around issues of

193 Schatmeier, supra note 196, at 557; see Memorandum of Agreement Between The
U.S. Dep’t Of Justice And The City of Cincinnati, Ohio and the Cincinnati Police Dep’t, U.S.
DEP’T JUST. (Aug. 6, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/crt/memorandum- agreement-betweenunited-states-department-justice-and-city-cincinnati-ohio-and (Aug. 6, 2015).
194 See Schatmeier, supra note 196, at 558.
195 See id. at 567, 577 (stating that “the CA’s inclusion of the ACLU and the FOP as
parties made the reforms more legitimate and more effective”).
196 Id. at 567.
197 Id. at 577 (stating that plaintiff’s taking an active role in the MOA reforms helped
prevent future breaches of the MOA and CA).
198 See id.
199 See id. at 586 (emphasizing that substantive reforms included a reduction in useof-force violations, increased citizen satisfaction with the police department, and a change
in the culture of Cincinnati’s policing from a materialistic model to one emphasizing
problem-solving and community interaction).
200 Chanin, supra note 183, at 102.
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excessive use of force and unlawful searches and seizures. 201 Los
Angeles achieved improvement in these areas by mimicking
tactics of former Pittsburgh Police Chief McNeilly, such as
computerized early misconduct identification systems, officer retraining, and strengthening its own oversight bodies to enforce
accountability even after federal oversight lifted.202 Los Angeles
Police Chief Charlie Beck described the consent decree as the
“catalyst” to making the department “transparent and . . . more
effective than we’ve ever been.”203 Scholars attribute the shift in
transparency to the consent decree strengthening the oversight
role of the Police Commission and community civil rights
organizations.204 Notably, real change occurred only after a
decade of oversight suggesting that adequate time increases
effectiveness of § 14141 reforms.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS: AMENDING § 14141 FOR LONG TERM
TRANSFORMATION
Congress should amend 42 U.S.C. § 14141 to create an
additional legal mechanism compelling police departments to set
a concurrent agreement with stakeholder groups when they reach
a memorandum of agreement or a consent decree with the DOJ.205
This would ensure that the reform process represents both police
stakeholder interests and community socio-economic group
interests, thereby creating durable change.206 The stakeholder
201 Id.; see U.S. v. City of L.A. – Consent Decree – Introduction, U.S. DEP’T JUST.,
https://www.justice.gov/crt/us-v-city-los-angeles-consent-decree-introduction (last visited
Sept. 15, 2019).
202 See Chanin, supra note 183, at 102; see also Fuoco, supra note 185 (“One frequently
cited example of the [Pittsburgh Police] [D]epartment’s ‘best practices’ is a computerized
early-warning system that analyzes all aspects of an officer’s job performance so that hints
of trouble can be detected and dealt with quickly.”).
203 Joel Rubin, Federal judge lifts LAPD consent decree, L.A. TIMES (May 16, 2013,
12:00 AM), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/may/16/local/la-me-lapd-consent-decree20130517.
204 Chanin, supra note 183, at 107.
205 See Schatmeier, supra note 196, at 572 (emphasizing how implementing a more
effective leadership model that improves accountability, transparency, and stakeholder
input will lead to positive change).
206 See id. at 576 (describing how the Cincinnati Police Department designed programs
where community members worked with the police department on solutions to community
problems, which has led to innovative solutions, including programs to reduce violence and
police use-of-force incidents).
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concurrent agreement would likewise be valid in a court of law and
will conclude simultaneously with the close of the settlement
agreement.
The reasoning for this amendment is two-pronged. First, as
with the CPD, reform will no longer exist as a top-down process
that departments struggle to implement. Instead, the stakeholder
groups will help shape the mandated reform to policies uniquely
appropriate to the city and police department.207 Second, the
community groups will have a legal mechanism to act as an
oversight body. For instance, in Cincinnati, the legal enforcement
of community oversight has had a more lasting effect than in Los
Angeles where the community role is variable with political
changes.208 Furthermore, statutorily empowering groups like
police unions and civil rights organizations adds these groups to
the institutional framework to avoid drastic reform erosion.
Through this new mechanism we prevent the Pittsburgh
phenomenon, where the only institution with decision-making
power after federal oversight ended was the police department
itself. Consequently, adding legal mechanisms empowering
stakeholders creates a local oversight body who can hold police
departments accountable after the federal government leaves.
The amendment to § 14141 would read:
Any department entering a memorandum of agreement or
consent decree with the United States government will enter a
concurrent agreement with stakeholder groups from its
jurisdiction. The stakeholder agreement shall include as plaintiffs
both groups representing police and groups representing
community civil rights advocates. The stakeholder agreement will
remain in effect until the settlement agreement or
consent decree closes.
Under this statute stakeholders are defined as local groups
representing the city residents and the local police union.
Similarly, the statute specifies that both the police and citizen
207 Id. at 577 (“Participation in [] negotiations by representatives from all the groups
substantially affected pattern or practice reforms [in Cincinnati], e.g., police officers, police
management, the DOJ, the City, and various city interest groups; improves upon command
and control regulation because broad participation legitimizes the decisions made by the
representatives with the parties they represent and the general public.”).
208 See Chanin, supra note 183, at 108 (emphasizing how this process has sustained
positive effects where numbers of post-reform citizen complaints have continued to decline,
as did the use of force incidence, and the number of injuries sustained by CPD officers).
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groups must be represented for the collaborative agreement to be
valid because involvement of these groups was central to the
success in Cincinnati.209 Through this dual representation, voices
from all interested parties will be invested in creating and
maintaining reform under § 14141.
While the DOJ promulgates many recommendations
surrounding community policing, at present it falls short of using
the law to strengthen this ideal. By adding this amendment,
community groups can utilize the same tools as the DOJ such as
injunctive relief to compel changes while the department is under
review.
Likewise, by creating these coalitions as legally
recognized institutions, the DOJ sets the standard that the
consensus from the community is as valid as the consensus from
those within the police department. Through this improved legal
mechanism, a new foundation for policing is created in
jurisdictions where collaboration and accountability is necessary.
CONCLUSION
This country was founded on a set of unalienable rights. Since
the Civil War, activists and legislators made changes to our
statutory framework mandating that those human rights be
accessible to all citizens. The policing context should be no
different. Respect for police and police institutions is too often
conflated with indemnity for all unlawful behavior ranging from
deprivation of due process procedures to homicide.
Innovations in civil rights law under 42 U.S.C. § 14141 created
a framework for a new style of policing, one that is a “another kind
of law enforcement altogether, one that understands people and
just doesn’t put a uniform in our face.”210 In fact, federal
investigations, oversight, and implementation of community
policing has made marked changes in our communities.
Notwithstanding these advances, there are still barriers to these
changes having a lasting effect.
209 See id. at 579.
210 Lynh Bui & Peter Hermann, Baltimore mayor, police commissioner pledge to move
forward on reform efforts, WASH. POST (Apr. 4, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/baltimore-police- commissionerpledges-reform-despite-justice-dept-action/2017/04/04/5b745ce8-b88b-4b5e-a14b4f9f84376168_story.html?utm_term=.775b2ca3bb81.
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By amending § 14141 to create a binding agreement with
community stakeholder groups, the government can do more than
create temporary improvements. Instead, it can change the status
quo from one where civilians may be murdered while exiting a car
and police persons on duty may commit crimes against humanity,
to one where police can serve in peace and citizens feel protected.

